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The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment:
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GEORGE C. THOMAS III*
For over half a century, scholars have been debating whether the
Fourteenth Amendment acted to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights so that its
protections are enforceable against the states. One largely overlooked
aspect of the debate is whether the states intended to impose incorporation
on themselves when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.. As Professor
Bryan Wildenthal recognizes in his impressive new article on
incorporation, the ratification issue turns on whether the states were
sufficiently on notice of congressional intent to incorporate. Wildenthal's
signal contribution in his new article is to develop a metric to help answer
the notice question. This Response to Wildenthal reviews the evidence and
concludes that it is insufficient to meet Wildenthal's metric. I concede that
some in Congress (though not very many) are on record as recognizing that
the drafters of the amendment intended it to enforce the Bill of Rights
against the states. The problem, for Thomas, is the silence that greeted the
amendment during the ratification process and the congressional election of
1866. While the silence is not complete, it is nonetheless profound. The new
evidence that Wildenthal and I present in these pages only deepens the
mysteries of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment has
provoked intense controversy for over a century. Upon a first reading, one
might wonder what all the fuss was about:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. I
Deep mysteries lurk in these lofty words. What is a "privilege" of
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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citizenship? An "immunity"? The issue that Bryan Wildenthal 2 and I discuss
is whether the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment made
some, or all, of the rights in the first eight amendments to the Constitution
part of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," an idea
that has come to be known as "incorporation."Another mystery is why the incorporation debate so engages, and
enrages, legal academics. Charles Fairman and William Crosskey were the
first scholars to cross swords over this issue in the late 1940s and early
1950s.3 An immense amount of scholarship followed, decade after decade.4
It never seems to die. I published an article in 2001 that addressed some
aspects of the incorporation issue5 and thought I was finished with the topic.
But when I read Bryan Wildenthal's excellent article in draft form, I realized
I had to make one more attempt at the riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There are at least two reasons why the incorporation riddle continues to
attract scholars. Few issues are as fundamental as the relationship between
the states and the federal government. If John Adams and Thomas Jefferson
were sitting at my elbow as I write this Response, I imagine that they would
nod and smile, unsurprised that we still debate the question that divided
them. Moreover, although many scholars have confidently claimed
overwhelming historical evidence for, or against, incorporation, I am not in
that camp. The evidence is sketchy, inconclusive, and subject to various
plausible interpretations. The riddle will not go away because no one has
solved it.
2 Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007).
3 See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); William Winslow
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954).
4 My favorite book-length treatments are MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); JOSEPH B.
JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) [hereinafter JAMES,
FRAMING]; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1984); and JOSEPH T. SNEED III, FOOTPRINTS ON THE ROCKS OF THE MOUNTAIN (1997).
For two excellent books about the broader history of the period, see EARL M. MALTZ,
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE (1988).
5 George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers'Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2001).
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I. FACING THE FRAMEWORK PROBLEM
The incorporation question has produced fireworks in part because no
agreement exists about how to frame the question. Moreover, most writers do
not seem even to appreciate that they are cumulating evidence without a
frame within which to evaluate it. Here's the problem: How much intent, and
from whom, do we need to be able to pronounce Section 1 to contain the first
eight amendments?
If the only intent that matters is that of the drafter of Section 1, John
Bingham, then the incorporation question is easily solved. Despite the best
efforts of Fairman, Raoul Berger,6 and others to portray Bingham as
confused or clownish, 7 he was neither. He was clear that the purpose of
Section 1 was to give Congress the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights
guarantees against state actors. But, to my knowledge, no scholar has
maintained that Bingham's speeches are sufficient, standing alone, to
produce incorporation.
Courts often defer to the intent of the drafter of a statute. Why do
scholars seek additional evidence on the incorporation question? Is it just that
more evidence is better? No, I think the reason is more fundamental. To
authorize the federal government to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states is a seismic shift in the tectonic plates that underlie our government.
Barron v. Baltimore8 held in 1833 that the Bill of Rights limited only federal
actors. It was the product of a unanimous Court, written by Chief Justice
Marshall. I agree with Wildenthal's summary of the reasons why Barron was
"almost certainly" correctly decided. 9
To accomplish the seismic shift necessary to reverse Barron requires
both clarity of expression and a public communication of the change, as
Wildenthal realizes (more on his view of this point in a moment). The Court
in The Slaughter-House Cases said that to read Section 1 broadly would
"radically change[] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other and of both these governments to the people."'10
The Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments accomplished even more
fundamental seismic shifts in other tectonic plates that had undergirded our
government, to be sure, but the wording of these amendments is crystal clear.
Not so for Section 1 of the Fourteenth. It could have been crystal clear if
6 See Fairman, supra note 3; RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
7 See Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1535-36.
8 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
9 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1530-32. I sought to dramatize the fear of the federal
government that led to the Bill of Rights in Thomas, supra note 5, at 149.
10 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
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Bingham had added a simple clause, as follows: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States, including those defined in the first eight amendments to
the Constitution."
Lacking that kind of clarity, we need more evidence than just the intent
of the drafter. We want to know that the country intended to put Congress
and the federal courts in charge of ensuring that the states follow the Bill of
Rights. That evidence can come in various forms. First, one might claim a
sort of "plain meaning" of the text. What else would the rights created in the
Bill of Rights be but privileges or immunities? Second, if one finds
"privileges or immunities" not transparently clear, one can seek to infuse
clarity into those terms by drawing from Republican theories of the day or
commonly held views of the meaning of "privileges" and "immunities." 11
The Republicans believed that the federal government had a critical role to
play in achieving equality and liberty. Part of that role could be to insist that
states obey the Bill of Rights. These arguments can, of course, be cumulated
by claiming that the phrase "privileges or immunities" is relatively clear and
that any vagueness is cleared up by reflecting on how the Republicans of the
day would have understood the terms.
Most scholars seek more evidence. This is, I think, because if
incorporation were simply obvious to all educated citizens who thought
about it, it would have left substantial traces beyond the debates on the floor
of Congress-in the public discourse outside of Congress and in the political
campaign of 1866. Those traces would confirm what plain meaning suggests
to some theorists. Scholars have also parsed the Congressional Globe seeking
evidence of the intent of the Framers. Newspapers, books, and monographs
of the period might tell us what the country, and thus the state ratifying
conventions, thought Section 1 meant.
The question is essentially one of critical mass. The research done to date
has failed to uncover evidence that renders the meaning of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as clear as the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. But if a sufficient mass of evidence can be found, then one can
assert that however amorphous "privileges or immunities" may look to us, it
was clear enough to the critical actors of the time-the Congress that
reported the amendment to the states and the states that ratified it.
II. WHAT HAS COME BEFORE
In 1947, Justice Black attached an appendix to his dissent in Adamson v.
11 Curtis has one of the best accounts of Republican theories of the day. See CURTIS,
supra note 4, at 26-56.
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California that set out the historical argument in favor of incorporation.' 2
Two years later, Fairman published a lengthy critical assessment of Black's
theory. 13 Crosskey, in his mammoth 1954 law review article-143 pages-
repeatedly assailed Fairman's methodology and even his integrity. For
example, Crosskey wrote: "The illegitimacy of Mr. Fairman's whole effort
was not its only fault. In addition, there was his handling, or mishandling, of
the evidence."'14 Fairman later accused Crosskey of "suppress[ing]...
important evidence" and failing to be "candid and objective."' 15
The passionate debate over incorporation has sometimes produced
scholarship that elevates advocacy over objectivity. I plead nolo contendere
here. My 2001 article argued that incorporation had caused the Court to cut
back on criminal procedure rights because broad rights were too "expensive"
when applied in state courts to cases involving serious crimes like murder,
robbery, and rape. To make my case, I had to undermine the Black/Crosskey
theory. If it were unquestionable that the Framers intended the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate all the rights in the first eight amendments, and if
the state ratifying conventions were aware of that intent, then the Court never
had a choice.16 In that world, the push-back on federal rights was merely an
unfortunate consequence of the much-needed Fourteenth Amendment.
Naturally, I like to think I was fairer and more balanced than some of the
critics of incorporation, but I did have an agenda.17
That is why I wanted another crack at the Fourteenth Amendment riddle.
I wanted to sift through the evidence without needing it to come out a
particular way. Unlike Crosskey and Fairman, Wildenthal and I worked
together on the evidence, exchanging ideas and occasionally causing each
other to modify a position. We hope that a collaborative process will give as
accurate a picture as possible. To be sure, however, we will sometimes
disagree about what is the best inference to draw from the objective facts on
the ground.
12 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
13 Fairman, supra note 3.
14 Crosskey, supra note 3, at 10. Only 118 pages were devoted to incorporation. The
rest of the article presented an argument that Barron was wrongly decided.
15 Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Limitations on State
GovernmentalAuthority, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 40, 51, 78 (1953).
16 Here I agree with Wildenthal's point about the power of originalism as an
interpretive theory. See Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1526-27. I would state the point as
follows: If the history is sufficiently clear, and still relevant, the Court has no choice but
to follow it.
17 1 do not accuse Wildenthal of having an agenda. Indeed, he is to be commended
for acknowledging his point of view-that nationalizing the Bill of Rights is a "morally
and intellectually beautiful idea." Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1518.
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III. WHAT WILDENTHAL ADDS
Wildenthal offers a temperate review of the evidence that demonstrates
the skewed readings of Fairman, Berger, and others who have sought to
make incorporation look like fool's gold. He is less critical of Crosskey, who
sometimes seeks to make incorporation appear so obvious that only a fool
could miss it. 18 But I'll give Wildenthal a pass here because I agree that
Crosskey presents the evidence more objectively than Fairman and Berger.
Wildenthal lodges valid criticisms of some of my arguments from my
2001 article and compliments some of my observations and coverage. He
discusses two neglected pieces of evidence from the public discourse that
occurred about the time of ratification. 19 He also provides useful details
about the news coverage of the debates in Congress.
But, to my mind, Wildenthal's most important contribution is to deal
thoughtfully with the question of state ratification. This question is part and
parcel of the "critical mass" issue about the country's understanding of
Section 1. The reason that the debate on the floor of Congress matters is not
just to glean congressional intent but also to begin to gauge the extent to
which the states were put on notice of that intent. Wildenthal agrees, noting
that we should require "fair notice" of the intended meaning before
ratification binds the states to that meaning.20
But he argues, and I agree, that one should not demand "specific,
affirmative confirmation at the state level."'21 The difficulty with that
standard of proof is that direct evidence is not available. Only scattered
records exist, and they fail to make the case either way.22 The middle ground
seems best to me here. If we can be reasonably confident that congressional
intent to incorporate was part of the public discourse, implicitly or explicitly,
then it seems fair to read ratification as acquiescence in that intent.
Wildenthal provides a metric that allows the question to be answered
without direct evidence of the intent of the ratifying legislatures. His test is
whether Congress "clearly, publicly, and candidly conveyed to the country"
18 At one point, for example, Crosskey asserts that it was "certainly simple, obvious,
and undeniable" that the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Section 1 applied to rights
"under the first eight amendments." Crosskey, supra note 3, at 80. If it really were that
"simple, obvious, and undeniable," why did it take him 118 pages to make the case?
19 See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
20 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1612.
21 Id. at 1613. For my earlier view on this, see Thomas, supra note 5, at 209-10.
22 Masochistic readers can entertain themselves by comparing Fairman's and
Crosskey's coverage of the scattered records that exist. See Fairman, supra note 3, at 58-
93; Crosskey, supra note 3, at 104-111. Fairman's treatment is buried in his account of
inconsistent state statutes and constitutions.
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its intent to incorporate the Bill of Rights. 23 If that metric is satisfied, he
argues, it is fair to read state legislative ratification as accepting
congressional intent. So, to take a hypothetical example, if the public
discourse on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) had included awareness
that it would subject women to the military draft on the same basis as men,
the ratifying states should be held to have embraced that interpretation of the
ERA.
Qr, to take a real life example, Michael Curtis has exhaustively examined
the linguistic meanings of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" in the
years prior to 1866.24 He concludes that those terms naturally would have
encompassed all rights in the first eight amendments, as well as other rights,
and thus the text put the state ratifying conventions on notice. If I agreed with
Curtis, then my Response would be a short one, but I do not. Three facts
caution against accepting his conclusion. First, as I will show, numerous
legal actors proceeded in the period 1866-1869 as if "privileges or
immunities" had nothing to do with the Bill of Rights. Second, Senate
opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment challenged the proponents to give a
meaning of privileges and immunities. 25 If it were as clear as Curtis suggests,
that would have been an embarrassingly futile strategy. Third, no proponent
responded to the challenge by saying that, of course, "privileges or
immunities" included the first eight amendments.
As to the latter point, I realize that the call for clarity was made at the
very end of debate while proponents were trying to get a vote on the
amendment that day,26 and time was of the essence. But when opponents also
raised a question about the meaning of the word "abridged" in Section 1,
Senator Jacob Howard, who had introduced the amendment in the Senate,
took the time to answer that objection.27 So when Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland and Thomas Hendricks of Indiana said that the meaning of
"privileges or immunities" was unknown, it presented an easy target for a
quick riposte if the meaning were as widely understood as Curtis claims. But
no one took the bait.
If we insist on other evidence that the ratifying conventions were on
notice of incorporation, as I believe we should, Wildenthal's metric is the
appropriate one. It is not met simply by asserting that The New York Times
23 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1612.
24 Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000).
25 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040 (1866) (Sen. Thomas Hendricks, D-
Ind.); id. at 3041 (Sen. Reverdy Johnson, D-Md.).
26 Id. at 3041 (Sen. Jacob Howard, R-Mich.).
27 Id. at 3039.
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covered the debates over Bingham's proposal for four days in a row28 or that
the Times made front page news of Senator Howard's list of rights from the
first eight amendments that were to be protected by Section 1.29 One must be
satisfied that Congress "clearly, publicly, and candidly conveyed to the
country"-the entire country, not just the East Coast30 -its intent to impose
the first eight amendments on the states.
At this point, Wildenthal flinches. He concedes that evidence of "any
strong public awareness of nationalizing the entire Bill of Rights" is "vague
and scattered."'3 1 He then proceeds on the assumption that "there was,
essentially, silence out in the country on the incorporation issue, during
ratification" 32 to see where that takes the inquiry. In my view, it puts him in
an uncomfortable box, forcing him ultimately to embrace a version of the
Kyvig-Aynes position that privileges the intent of the adopters over that of
the ratifiers. I reject the Kyvig-Aynes position, as articulated by Aynes, that
"it is the work of the framers that should trump any contrary views held by
individual ratifiers. ' '33 This makes nonsense of the notion of sovereignty.
Under our federal structure, the federal government can gain sovereignty
only when the states surrender it.
Of course, once one assumes that congressional intent must be privileged
over even evidence of contrary state intent, the game is over. This is my
problem with much of the incorporation debate. Once you put your
assumptions into place, your side wins. I was guilty of that in my 2001
article, assuming that only explicit state legislative acknowledgment of
incorporation should count.
To be sure, Wildenthal's version of the Kyvig-Aynes position is
defensible because he privileges congressional intent only when the states
have been put on fair notice of that intent. But after he assumes that there
was essentially silence on incorporation during the ratification process, I
don't understand how he has proven fair notice. To find fair notice from
silence is a bridge too far for me.
I agree, however, with Wildenthal that it is for readers to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the states were put on fair notice of
congressional intent to incorporate the Bill of Rights. My task is to gather the
28 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1557.
29 1d. at 1564.
30 Wildenthal notes that Howard's speech was "apparently" covered by papers in
Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, D.C. Id.
31 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1600.
32 Id. at 1609.
33 Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and
What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REv. 289, 320-21 (2006).
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evidence and present it as objectively as I can and without any presumptions
that do much of the interpretive work. I begin with a sketch of the context in
which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, approved by Congress, and
ratified by the states.
IV. INCORPORATION POINTS OF AGREEMENT
Returning to a debate that has been as tendentious as any in legal
academia, I first sketch some points that I think are not controversial.
Obviously, the Fourteenth Amendment created obligations of state actors that
were enforceable in federal court and that could be enforced as well by
Congress. One of those obligations was not to deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Another obligation was not to
deny any person the equal protection of the laws. The notion of due process
had, of course, been around at least since 1791, and equal protection of the
laws does not seem all that difficult to interpret.
The difficult part of Section 1 is the set of obligations created by the first
clause of the second sentence, which protects the "privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States." Though the phrase has a glorious ring to it,
what exactly does it mean? Two basic approaches developed in seeking to
understand the substance protected by Section 1. In the nineteenth century,
the Court approached "privileges or immunities" as if they had free-standing
meanings that had little to do with the first eight amendments. The Slaughter-
House Court attempted a partial list that drew from the body of the
Constitution-such as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right
to use the navigable waters of the United States-as well as two rights from
the Bill of Rights-the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances. 34
After struggling with the free-standing meaning for three decades, the
Court began, ever so tentatively, to read the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
more generally into Section 1.35 In 1947, the Court in Adamson faced a stark
34 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873).
35 See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes a State from taking private property for public
use without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (noting that a "conception of liberty under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right to free speech"); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause was incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment). It is not important to the incorporation issue, but the twentieth-
century Court chose to use the Due Process Clause as the home of the substantive
protections imposed on the states. A more logical home, and the one the Framers clearly
intended, was the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But as Akhil Amar noted with
characteristic flair, the nineteenth century Court "strangled the privileges-or-immunities
2007] 1635
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choice. Four dissenters favored some version of incorporation, but the
majority rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment "draw[s] all the
rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection." 36 Justice Frankfurter
wrote a broad concurring opinion that sought to lay incorporation to rest once
and for all. The question had, after all, been settled only ten years earlier in
an opinion by Justice Cardozo. 37 If that did not persuade the legal world,
Frankfurter noted that the judges who had passed on the Amendment and did
not favor incorporation "included those whose services in the cause of human
rights and the spirit of freedom are the most conspicuous in our history,"
among them Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, as well as Cardozo.38
Frankfurter's effort was in vain. While the Court has never held that
Section 1 incorporates all of the rights in the first eight amendments, almost
all had been incorporated by 1969.39 This unstoppable doctrinal revolution
reflected, I believe, both a greater appreciation for individual rights and
liberty and also a realization on the Court's part that some state courts were
failing to provide sufficient rights to suspects and defendants. As many have
noted, part of the Court's concern was the way states were treating blacks
and the poor.40 When looking for a way to bring the states into line in the
mid-twentieth century, the Bill of Rights appeared to offer a natural and easy
solution.
It is, as Justice Harlan has noted, an easy solution without a theory. 41 If
Black was correct, then all of the rights in the first eight amendments
clause in its crib." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 255 n.* (2000).
36 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947).
37 Id. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937)).
38 Id. at 62.
39 It is a bit unclear which rights remain unincorporated, as the Court has sometimes
treated a right as if it were incorporated without actually holding that it is. See, e.g.,
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (noting assumption that right to bail is
incorporated). Cases holding rights not to be incorporated that have not been overruled
are Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms); Edwards v. Elliot, 88 U.S. 532 (1874) (Seventh Amendment right to civil
jury).
40 See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 238, 240 (1966) (asserting that "[w]hat we have seen in the
South is the perversion of the criminal process into an instrument of official oppression").
41 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(complaining that "the Court has compromised on the ease of the incorporationist
position, without its internal logic").
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constitute a complete definition of due process of law.42 If Frankfurter was
correct, none of the rights, other than due process, are included in the
Fourteenth Amendment. But any solution that would have some, but not all
rights, included in the Fourteenth Amendment must identify the theory that
discriminates. While scholars like Akhil Amar have attempted such a
theory,43 the Court has never articulated a test other than "fundamental
fairness," a concept so vague as to be almost worthless. Let us return to the
Thirty-Ninth Congress and see what we can uncover about the likely
meaning of Section 1.
V. THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS
I agree with Wildenthal that, in 1866, "the political plate for both
Republicans and Democrats was already full to overflowing with issues that
(for them) were far more pressing and contentious [than Section 1]-
especially Black voting rights and whether and how to restore full political
rights to rebel states and individuals. '44 The United States was a divided,
traumatized, and bitter country. The Union Army occupied the rebel states.
The resentment felt by those in the defeated South is easy to imagine. But the
North was deeply resentful, too, because of the horrible costs of the war. The
President who had (barely) held together the North and won the war lay
dead, the victim of a Southern assassin. Eight percent of the white male
population aged eighteen to forty-three died in the Civil War, a rate six times
higher than in World War 11.45 Thus, when debating the future of the country,
many, both inside and outside of Congress, "waved the bloody shirt."
The Thirteenth Amendment had solved the problem of slavery, at least as
a formal matter, but the status of the former Confederate states was a
looming crisis, the most pressing political question that the country had faced
since the founding. Because we know how events unfolded, the depth of the
1866 crisis is difficult for us to imagine. The man who was now President
was from the rebel state of Tennessee. Though a unionist, he favored re-
admission of the rebel states under terms deemed too lenient by most
42 Richard Aynes notes a delicious irony here. If Frankfurter had joined Black's
opinion in Adamson, the Court would have held that the first eight amendments, plus
equal protection, were the only protections offered by Section 1. Aynes, supra note 33, at
301-02. In that world, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), would have been decided differently, or at least under a different
rubric.
43 AMAR, supra note 35, at 215-30.
44 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1603.
45 Craig Lambert, The Deadliest War, HARV. MAG., May-June 2001, at 15,
available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/050155.html.
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Republicans in Congress.
When the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened on December 4, 1865, all of
the former Confederate states had ratified the Thirteenth Amendment except
Florida, Mississippi, and Texas.46 But the Congress refused to seat any
senators and representatives from the rebel states. The Radical Republicans
argued that the defeated Confederacy had become a territory that could be
governed indefinitely by Washington. 47 Congress created a Joint Committee
on Reconstruction to report whether any of the former Confederate states
were "entitled to be represented in either House of Congress." 48
The prospect of the indefinite governance of the conquered provinces by
force of arms could not have been viewed with favor by moderate
Republicans. Thus, many Republicans wanted to find a way to readmit the
rebel states, at some point, provided they met the right conditions. Finding
the right timeline and the right set of conditions were intensely controversial
issues.
Despite the military occupation, lawlessness ran in torrents in the streets
of Southern cities and towns. Congressmen reported that "[e]very mail brings
to the records of injustice and outrage."49 The policy of the rebels "is to
render it so uncomfortable and hazardous for loyal men to live among them
as to compel them to leave .... Others have been murdered in cold blood as
a warning to all northern men who should attempt to settle in the South."'50
A particular concern about the lawlessness in the South was the denial of
free speech and freedom of assembly to those who might challenge white
rule. Mississippi's 1865 Black Code, for example, made it a crime for blacks
to give seditious speeches, or even preach the Gospel, without a license from
a "regularly organized church."'51
Given the lawlessness in the South, and the perils faced by former slaves
and Union loyalists, the Republican majority wanted to legally hobble the
rebel states as a condition to regaining full statehood. Thus was born the
Fourteenth Amendment. As odd as it might sound to modern readers, Section
1 did not receive as much attention as Section 2, which contained a weak
46 FindLaw, United States Constitution: Amendments, Amendment XIII, n.5,
available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendments.html#f5 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007).
47 See SNEED, supra note 4, at 49-83.
48 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1865).
49 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1838 (1866) (Rep. Sidney Clarke, R-Kan.)
(commenting on the need for the Civil Rights Bill).
50 Id. at 2082 (1866) (Rep. Sidney Perham, R-Me.).
51 1865 Miss. Laws 165-67.
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version of suffrage for the former slaves. 52 When Thaddeus Stevens of
Pennsylvania introduced the final version of the Amendment in the House,
he said, "The second section I consider the most important in the article." 53
Section 3 was also controversial. It went through several iterations, all of
which sought to penalize support of the Confederacy. An early version
denied the right to vote in federal elections to anyone who had given "aid and
comfort" to the insurrection, but only for a period of four years. 54 The
version that was ultimately reported to the states forbade the holding of any
state or federal office by those who had taken an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States and had then supported the Confederacy.55
This bar was for life but could be removed by a vote of two-thirds of each
House.
Section 1 sailed around the edge of this political maelstrom. And, to the
extent it created controversy, most debate centered on the extent to which it
would permit Congress to federalize all state and local law. 56 Almost no
effort was made to question, or explain, the meaning of "privileges or
immunities." Crosskey concedes that "it would be idle to pretend that the
debate on the amendment, standing by itself, was very informative as to what
the House thought the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the amendment
meant." 57
We should not be surprised that the meaning of "privileges or
immunities" remained somewhat unfocused. Fresh from a hard-fought
victory over the rebel states, and holding almost eighty percent of the House
and Senate seats, Republicans enjoyed both the moral high ground and
political control of Congress. Most Republicans believed that their theories
of equality and liberty had prevailed for good. They would have been content
with a rough sense of what Section 1 protected, confident that they could iron
out the details in subsequent legislation.
Whatever the ultimate meaning of Section 1, Congress saw itself as the
principal enforcer. John Bingham's initial draft that was reported to the
House simply said, "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which
52 Section 2 reduced representation in the House of states that refused to allow all
male inhabitants to vote. The strong version of black suffrage will, of course, come in the
Fifteenth Amendment.
53 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, R-Pa.).
54 Id. at 2545.
55 Id. at 3148-49.
56 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064-65 (1866) (Rep. Robert Hale,
R-N.Y.); id. at 1095 (Rep. Giles Hotchkiss, R-N.Y.); id. at 2500 (Rep. George Shanklin,
D-Ky.); id. at 2538 (Rep. Andrew Rogers, D-N.J.); id. at 3147 (Rep. Aaron Harding, D-
Ky.).
57 Crosskey, supra note 3, at 70.
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shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons
in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property. '58 To be sure, Bingham would later rewrite the amendment into its
current form that permits courts also to enforce Section 1, reacting to the
concern that control of the Congress might someday pass to the Democrats.
Before I turn to the evidence on incorporation, consider an additional
way to view Section 1-the equal-rights account that many in Congress
supported. On this account, states were required to give everyone the same
set of substantive privileges and immunities and to enforce those privileges
and immunities in an even-handed way. For example, Thaddeus Stevens
explained the point of the Fourteenth Amendment as "allow[ing] Congress to
correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates
on one man shall operate equally upon all."' 59 If a state wanted to abolish free
speech or free exercise of religion for all citizens, under the equal rights
reading of Section 1, it could do so. What states could not do is what
Mississippi did in its Black Code of 1865 when it limited the rights of only
blacks. To be sure, the equal-rights approach is not inconsistent with
incorporation. One could believe both that the Section 1 privileges and
immunities included the Bill of Rights and that states had to apply those
rights equally to all.
From here, I consider whether there exists a sufficient critical mass of
discourse about incorporation that would allow one to assume that it was part
of the obligations that the states agreed to assume when they ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment. The story naturally begins with John Bingham of
Ohio, who was the principal exponent of incorporation. He started from the
premise that the Constitution already created an obligation on the part of
state actors to comply with the Bill of Rights. He deployed two theories to
support his premise. One is that the Article VI Supremacy Clause makes the
Bill of Rights binding on state actors.60 Article VI requires state judges to
apply the Constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the land. It
also requires state judges, legislatures, and executive officials to take an oath
to support the federal Constitution. 61
Though Bingham's expression of this argument is intertwined with
arguments drawn from Daniel Webster and George Washington, and is
difficult to decipher, I think he is arguing that once the Bill of Rights was
ratified, it became a part of the Constitution subject to Article VI. On this
58 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
59 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, R-Pa.).
60 Id. at 1090 (Rep. John Bingham, R-Ohio).
61 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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account, Barron did not-could not-withdraw the rights granted by Article
VI. All Barron did was to refuse to allow a remedy for violations of those
rights by state actors. Bingham's Fourteenth Amendment would thus
constitute "an express grant of power" that would enforce "these great
canons of the supreme law" against state actors.62
The problem with Bingham's Article VI argument is that it simply
assumes the outcome that Bingham desired. Article VI is silent about what
constitutes the Constitution of the United States, and Barron clearly held that
the Bill of Rights was not part of the federal Constitution where state actors
were concerned. Thus, until Barron was effectively overruled by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution of Article VI did not include the
Bill of Rights.
Bingham's second theory is the one that attracted the most attention on
the floor of Congress and in modem scholarship. Bingham argued that every
American had the right to life, liberty, and property. These rights come to us
from two provisions in the Constitution, both of which were, he said, already
binding on state actors:
The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.63
Bingham did not explain how the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause came to be binding on the states. Crosskey argues that Bingham and
other Republicans read its passive voice to bar deprivation of life, liberty, or
property by anyone, which would obviously include state actors. 64 That
seems a plausible reading of the Due Process Clause even though it is
contrary to Barron.
The "privileges and immunities" clause in Article V, Section 2 is, of
course, binding on the states. The problem is figuring out what it protects. On
the standard account, Section 2 refers to a preexisting set of privileges and
immunities, probably derived from natural law. Within that set of privileges
and immunities, states are forbidden from discriminating between their own
citizens and citizens of other states. Assuming, as was surely the case, that
owning real property was an Article IV privilege, a state could not forbid
ownership of its real property by citizens of other states. States would also
likely have to provide citizens of other states the same rights to sue, to
62 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. 1090 (1866) (Rep. John Bingham, R-Ohio).
63 Id. at 1089.
64 Crosskey, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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contract, and to have a fair trial as they provide their own citizens. But, as
Justice Bushrod Washington held in his capacity as circuit judge, the right to
take oysters from New Jersey beds was not a privilege of citizens in the
"several states," and New Jersey could thus forbid a Delaware citizen from
taking New Jersey oysters. 65 (Imagine New Jersey having oyster beds!)
Bingham expands the standard account of Article IV by pairing
"privileges and immunities" with the right to due process as against state
actors. At one point he defined "immunity" as the "[e]xemption from
unequal burdens," but continued: "Ah! say gentlemen who oppose this
amendment ... we are not opposed to the bill of rights that all shall be
protected alike in life, liberty, and property: we are only opposed to
enforcing it by national authority ...,,66 Later in the same speech, he asks,
"Is the bill of rights to stand in our Constitution hereafter, as in the past five
years with eleven States, a mere dead letter? It is absolutely essential to the
safety of the people that it be enforced. '67 He means, of course, enforced
against state actors. The critical move here is to assume that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause bound state actors, Barron notwithstanding.
Ultimately, the plausibility of Bingham's theories that the Bill of Rights
already bound state actors does not matter. The point is to assess how
widespread was the discussion, in and out of Congress, about the Fourteenth
Amendment making the Bill of Rights enforceable against state actors. When
Bingham said that it was essential that "the bill of rights" be enforced by the
amendment he had proposed, this puts into play the notion that the
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights.
Jacob Howard introduced the amendment in the Senate, and he embraced
incorporation. He relied on the plain meaning of Section 1 to assert that the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" included both
natural law rights and "the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first
eight amendments of the Constitution." 68 It is difficult to be much clearer
than that.
Not much else was said about Section 1 in the Senate. Michael Curtis
asserted that Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania "believed that Bill of
Rights liberties limited the states."' 69 Cowan said that the Constitution already
protected "the great principles of English and American liberty."' 70 Could that
include all the rights in the first eight amendments? Yes. Must it? No. Cowan
65 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 550-51 (E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).
66 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. 1089 (1866) (Rep. John Bingham, R-Ohio).
6 7 Id. at 1090.
68 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. 2765 (1866) (Sen. Jacob Howard, R-Mich.).
69 CURTIS, supra note 4, at 51.
70 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (Sen. Edgar Cowan, R-Pa.).
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could have had in mind a more limited set-perhaps as limited as the right to
due process of law. He said that the Due Process Clause already provided a
remedy for wrongs done in the Southern states. 71 Due process was likely, at
the time, to have had a largely procedural cast-the right to a trial, for
example. It could, of course, also entail substantive rights, such as the right to
serve on juries or own property. It could also entail rights in the first eight
amendments. The problem is that we just do not know what Cowan had in
mind.
What about the House? Here there is more evidence that members
understood Bingham's theories. Wildenthal follows Crosskey to argue that
Hiram Price of Iowa embraced incorporation of at least free speech because
he saw Section 1 as protecting "freedom of speech from state suppression. '" 72
Perhaps, but Price's principal concern seemed to be ensuring that out-of-state
citizens have the same speech rights as in-state citizens, an argument he
made several times. For example:
A citizen of a slave State could come into a free State at any time during the
last quarter of a century and express his opinion on any subject connected
with State rights or any other which agitated the public mind; but if a citizen
of a free State visiting a slave State expressed his opinion in reference to
slavery he was treated without much ceremony to a coat of tar and feathers
and a ride upon a rail.73
Wildenthal reads this as an assertion that Section 1 would guarantee free
speech without regard to whether the particular state gave free speech rights
to its own citizens. When I first read Price, I took him to mean that slave
states would have permitted criticism of slavery from their own citizens but
not from citizens of free states. If that is what he meant, then he is expressing
only a concern with equal rights and is opaque on incorporation. However,
given the mountain of evidence that anti-slavery speech was harshly
condemned in the South, 74 I am persuaded that my reading is less likely to be
correct. Thus, I think it fair to count Price in the incorporation camp for free
speech. Indeed, perhaps we can count him more broadly than just for free
speech, though the argument here is thin. Later in the same speech, he said
that if the amendment was "designed to protect a citizen" of a free state "in
going into a southern [s]tate where slavery has cursed the soil and the
inhabitants, then I am most decidedly in favor of it."' 75 "[T]o protect a
71 Id
72 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1547-48.
73 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1866) (Rep. Hiram Price, R-Iowa).
74 See, e.g., Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1596-99.
75 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1866) (Rep. Hiram Price, R-Iowa).
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citizen" might entail broader protections than free speech.
James Wilson of Iowa said, "I find in the bill of rights which the
gentleman [Bingham] desires to have enforced by an amendment to the
Constitution that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.' 76 Wilson's reference to "the bill of rights" that
Bingham sought to have enforced against the states is most naturally read as
the first eight amendments. Moreover, two years earlier, in the Thirty-eighth
Congress, Wilson had embraced Bingham's theory that the Bill of Rights
already bound state actors, both as a matter of the Supremacy Clause and
Article IV, Section 2.77 Wilson thus belongs in the group that publicly
acknowledged Bingham's intent to incorporate.
A little less clear is Robert Hale of New York. As part of his argument
against the Fourteenth Amendment, Hale said that the Bill of Rights already
limited the power of both federal and state legislatures. 78 But Bingham
produced a copy of Barron v. Baltimore to show that the Supreme Court had
rejected Hale's view of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to state actors. 79
As Hale voted for the amendment, it is fair to take him at his word that the
Bill of Rights should be enforceable against state actors, though he did not
openly acknowledge that he understood that to be the effect of the
amendment.
Even less clear is Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania, who said that
Section 1 "simply brings into the Constitution what is found in the bill of
rights of every State of the Union." 80 State constitutions were not uniform--
several, for example, did not require a grand jury indictment-making it hard
to know what Thayer was referencing. One natural reference was the right to
due process. Bingham had, after all, explicitly laid that right before the
Congress, and the right to due process was likely found in all of the state
constitutions of that era. Later, during the debate on the civil rights bill, a
speaker imputed to Thayer the view that the first eleven amendments are
"grants of power" that Congress can enforce on the states. Curtis said that
Thayer "accepted the characterization as correct. ' 81 That claims a little too
much. The speaker asked if he had misstated Thayer's position, and Thayer's
response was "I do not know that the gentleman has misstated my
76 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (Rep. James Wilson, R-Iowa).
7 7 Id. at 1202.
78 Id. at 1064 (Rep. Robert Hale, R-N.Y.).
79 Wildenthal's treatment of this exchange is excellent. Wildenthal, supra note 2, at
1540-41.
80 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866) (Rep. Martin Thayer, R-Pa.).
81 CURTIS, supra note 4, at 80.
1644 [Vol. 68:1627
RESPONSE TO WILDENTHAL
position," 82 hardly a robust embrace of incorporation. But at least Thayer did
not reject the statement that he believed the first eleven amendments applied
to the states.
Whatever Thayer's precise intent, he should count as part of the general
incorporation discourse in the House. To be sure, like almost everyone else
who spoke, he spoke more clearly about equal rights. Two sentences after his
reference to the state bills of rights, he emphasized that Section 1 deserved
support because it was "necessary for the equal administration of the law." 83
Crosskey puts Giles Hotchkiss, William Kelley, Thaddeus Stevens, and
John Farnsworth in the incorporation camp. Hotchkiss of New York said, "I
have no doubt that I desire to secure every privilege and every right to every
citizen in the United States that the gentleman who reports this resolution
[Bingham] desires to secure." 84 But the very next sentence seems to limit his
agreement to equality of treatment. "As I understand it, his object in offering
this resolution ... is ... no State shall discriminate between its citizens and
give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another. 85
William Kelley of Pennsylvania said that the "powers to be imparted" by
the Fourteenth Amendment "are already to be found in the Constitution. 86
John Farnsworth said that all of Section 1 was "already in the Constitution"
except for the Equal Protection Clause. 87 Thaddeus Stevens said that the
provisions in Section 1 "are all asserted in some form or other, in our
Declaration or organic law."' 88 But none of these statements tells us the
specific content of the Section 1 rights that were already in the Constitution.
Those speakers could be referring to Article IV privileges and immunities;
the Article IV, Section 4 guarantee of a republican form of government; or
the Necessary and Proper Clause. One, two, or all three of those provisions
could entail some, all, or none of the Bill of Rights guarantees.
When Kelley first rose to speak on the amendment, he said that the rights
contained in Section 1, which he did not define, had been in the Constitution
"from the hour of its adoption. They preceded the amendments proposed by
the first Congress .... ,,89 If the rights in Section 1 preceded the Bill of
82 CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270 (1866).
83 Id. at 2465.
84 Id. at 1095 (Rep. Glen Hotchkiss, R-N.Y.).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1057 (Rep. William Kelley, R-Pa.).
87 Id. at 2539 (Rep. John Farnsworth, R-Ill.).
88 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, R-Pa.).
89 Id. at 1057 (Rep. William Kelley, R-Pa.) (emphasis added); Crosskey, supra note
3, at 60 (failing to quote Kelley's complete statement, specifically that the Section 1
rights "preceded the [Bill of Rights]").
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Rights, "the powers to be imparted" by the Fourteenth Amendment would
seem to be a reference to other parts of the Constitution. Readers pointed out
to me that Kelley might very well have believed that the rights in the Bill of
Rights were natural law rights that preceded the Constitution itself. True
enough, but his remarks do not reference incorporation and thus do not add
to the "noise" about incorporation.
Nor did Stevens contribute to the incorporation discussion. He followed
his comment about Section 1 already being in our "organic law" by asserting
that the amendment would allow Congress to require that a state law that
"operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." 90 Then he provided
a series of examples of what Section 1 would protect, none of which
implicates the Bill of Rights. For example, he said that the amendment would
require that "[w]hatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish
the black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree." 91
The strategy of the amendment's opponents, most of whom were
Democrats, was in part to attack the vagueness of the meaning of "privileges
and immunities." When Senators Johnson and Hendricks complained that the
meaning was unclear, no one rose to expound Howard's theory of
incorporation. It is understandable that Howard did not wish to repeat his
crystal clear presentation, but a little strange that none of the other
proponents used Howard's theory to rebut the claim of lack of clarity.
Crosskey dismisses this argument by assuming that everyone knew the
proponents intended the incorporation of the first eight amendments; the only
question opponents were raising, he says, was what additional privileges and
immunities were being protected.92 It is too facile an assumption for me.
So here is my congressional scorecard: Bingham intended the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the pre-existing obligations of state actors created by
the Bill of Rights. Howard intended "privileges or immunities" to include the
first eight amendments. James Wilson understood Bingham's intent to
enforce against the states the pre-existing obligations under the Bill of
Rights. Hale and Thayer are a little less clear, but both can be squared with
Bingham's incorporation theory. Farnsworth is opaque. Price probably
contemplated free speech as one of the rights protected by Section 1 and
perhaps other rights as well. We do not know what "great principles" of law
Cowan had in mind. Stevens and Hotchkiss focused on an "equal rights"
reading of Section 1. Kelley did not say anything indicating that he saw
Section 1 as incorporating the Bill of Rights. The remainder of the Congress,
Crosskey concedes, "simply did not speak on the point, either one way or the
other; and neither did they say anything from which their views on the
90 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, R-Pa.).
91 Id.
92 Crosskey, supra note 3, at 79-80.
1646 [Vol. 68:1627
RESPONSE TO WILDENTHAL
subject can be inferred." 93
VI. PUBLICITY AND RATIFICATION
Michael Kent Curtis, whose No State Shall Abridge94 is one of the best
treatments of the origin, development, and interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has collected evidence from the campaign of 1866 relevant to
the Fourteenth Amendment. No statements specifically embraced total
incorporation, though several called for the protection of free speech and
press in the South.95 The evidence that bears directly on other protections
created by Section 1 phrased them at a high level of generality-such as
"rights to life, liberty, and property" 96 and "protection by the Government,
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety. ' 97 The
closest to an explicit embrace of broad incorporation that Curtis cites is an
editorial in the Dubuque Daily News that said Section 1 protected "the
privileges rightly conferred on every citizen by the federal [C]onstitution."98
This is perhaps an elegant statement of incorporation, but it could just as
easily be understood as a restatement of the language of Section 1-
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"--being recast as
privileges "conferred... by the federal [C]onstitution."
Wildenthal discusses an essay published in 1867 by Samuel S. Nicholas,
a conservative Kentucky Democrat and jurist.99 The chief target of his essay
is not the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Indeed,
the difficulty with the evidence is that when Nicholas speaks of the "recent
attempt in Congress to treat [the Bill of Rights guarantees] as guaranties
against the State governments,"' 00 it is not clear whether he is referring to the
Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment. Wildenthal points to
evidence that Nicholas meant the Fourteenth Amendment, while arguing that
it ultimately makes no difference because it shows incorporation discourse in
any event. 101
One piece of evidence that Nicholas meant only the Civil Rights Act is
93 Id. at 71.
94 CuRTis, supra note 4.
95 Id. at 132-33.
9 6 Id. at 140.
9 7 Id. at 144.
98 Id. at 132.
99 3 S. S. NICHOLAS, CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS, LEGAL AND POLITICAL (1867).
10 0 Id. at 48-49.
101 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1593-94.
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that he accuses Congress of "stolid ignorance of Constitutional law." 10 2 That
criticism makes sense if he was discussing the Civil Rights Act, but less so if
-he was referring to an amendment that would change the constitutional law.
On balance, however, I agree with Wildenthal. I think that, considering the
context, Nicholas was upbraiding Congress for passing an amendment that
was inconsistent with foundational constitutional principles running deeper
than any specific amendment. He was, in effect, complaining about the
seismic shift in our frame of government that he saw in Section 1.
I applaud the careful attention Wildenthal gives to Nicholas. It adds to
the evidence that some in the country were aware that Congress was seeking
to change the frame of government. President Johnson's Secretary of the
Interior, Orville Browning, published a letter predicting that the Fourteenth
Amendment would lead federal courts to "annihilate" the role that state
courts had traditionally played. 10 3  This also adds to the incorporation
discourse, as Wildenthal demonstrates. But two things strike me about all of
the evidence during the ratification process-there is very little of it and most
of it is quite vague. Yes, the frame of government was changing, but in what
ways? Perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment was a vehicle for the Radical
Republicans to rewrite state laws in general. Crosskey concluded that there
may have been "considerable inattention to the amendment at the time of its
adoption and, consequently, some unawareness of the true tenor of its various
provisions."]104
Wildenthal concedes, arguendo, that there was essentially "silence out in
the country on the incorporation issue, during ratification."' 1 5 Crosskey
agrees. This could have been, as Wildenthal believes, because incorporation
was non-controversial. 10 6 But I believe that, at least in the Southern and
border states, many would have feared the prospect of Radical Republicans
drafting legislation to enforce the federal Bill of Rights. Mississippi in 1865,
for example, could square its state right of free speech with its atrocious
Black Code. I would wager that Democrats in Mississippi would not have
relished the idea of free speech being enacted into federal law by the Radical
Republicans.
In 1866, politics was truly local. If Democratic candidates in Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina had been aware of Bingham's
incorporation thesis, I think they would have campaigned ferociously against
turning control over their rights to the Radical Republicans and federal
102 3 S.S. NICHOLAS, supra note 99, at 49.
103 Orville Browning, Letter to the Editor, CINCINNATI COM., Oct. 26, 1866, at 2.
104 Crosskey, supra note 3, at 119.
105 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1609.
106 Id. at 1601-02.
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judges. In the second half of the twentieth century, George Wallace advanced
his political career by condemning usurpation of state sovereignty by federal
judges.'0 7 In 1968, Wallace ran for president on a platform that included
calling the Supreme Court a "sorry, lousy, no-account outfit.' 0 8 He secured
almost ten million popular votes and -forty-six electoral votes, carrying five
Southern states. 109 Nothing suggests that a usurpation charge aimed at the
federal judiciary and Radical Republicans would not have played well in the
Southern and border states in 1866. Indeed, given that eleven states had just
tried to secede from the Union, Wallace's argument would have played even
better a hundred years earlier But except for Browning and Nicholas, no
evidence of that argument exists. Nor does evidence exist of politicans
campaigning for or against incorporation. That only two voices-Browning's
and Nicholas's-were raised in opposition to the increased federal power in
the Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act remains surprising to me.
To Wildenthal what is surprising is that the Republicans did not
campaign on the theme of nationalizing the Bill of Rights. I 10 He might be
right that the Republican silence is more puzzling than the silence of the
opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment. Earl Maltz finds the lack of
Republican conversation on the issue a "puzzling anomaly" that means
incorporation is "not proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' I
Wildenthal's own metric is whether the pre-ratification evidence clearly,
publicly, and candidly conveyed Congress's intent to incorporate the rights in
the first eight amendments. Has he met that metric? I am doubtful. Post-
ratification evidence increases my doubts.
VII. POST-RATIFICATION DEVELOPMENTS
By expanding the scope of my inquiry to 1869, I take advantage of
Wildenthal, who explicitly limited his review of the evidence to the period
1866-67. But the incorporation story cannot be told, in my opinion, without
including a few events from the years following 1867. Wildenthal will not
have adequate space to address fully the points I hope to make in this section.
His silence on any issue should not, therefore, be taken as agreement.
One year after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Supreme
Court heard an urgent appeal in a state death case, Twitchell v.
107 Richard Pearson, Former Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace Dies, WASH. POST,
Sep. 14, 1998, at A01.
108 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 243 (1983).
109 Pearson, supra note 107.
110 Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1609.
111 EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869
117(1990).
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Commonwealth.11 2 Noting that an appeal under the Judiciary Act would
normally be heard by a single Justice, the Court allowed it "to be argued
before the full bench because of the urgency of the case, and the momentous
importance of the result to the petitioner." ' 1 3 Twitchell claimed that
Pennsylvania failed to follow the Sixth Amendment command that he be
informed of "the .specific nature of the accusation, so as that he might be
enabled to prepare for a defence," and that the failure to comply with the
Sixth Amendment meant that the warrant for his execution was "not a due
process of law."" 14
In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, the
Court refused to reach the merits of the appeal because it lacked jurisdiction
to hear a case from a state court about the scope of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Barron v. Baltimore had settled the question, and the Court re-
affirmed Barron. Quoting from Barron, the Court stressed that "[t]he
Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States
for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the
individual States.' 115
Leaving aside, for a moment, the incorporation question, the Twitchell
Court's decision to quote that sentence from Barron is odd, coming only a
year after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. With the Fourteenth
Amendment part of the Constitution, regardless of what Section 1 is held to
mean, it was no longer true that the federal Constitution had nothing to do
with the government of the individual states. On the incorporation point, in
an earlier article, Wildenthal followed Akhil Amar who argued that Twitchell
"proves too much-and therefore nothing at all." 1 6 What this catchy phrase
means is that Twitchell lost because he located his due process argument in
the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth. In one sense, Amar and
Wildenthal are right. Barron was still good law as to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
But Amar and Wildenthal's argument requires us to believe that the
Court would let a formality prevent it from reviewing a case that it appeared
willing to review. It had, after all, already departed from the formal rule that
a single Justice could decide whether to hear the appeal. It is true that
nineteenth century courts were exceedingly formal, but consider how far this
argument takes formality. We are to believe that the Court knew that the
112 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
''
3 Id. at 325.
114 Id. at 323-24.
115 Id. at 326 (quoting Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
116 Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1084 (2000).
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Sixth Amendment was now part of the Fourteenth but refused to connect the
dots for the lawyer who based his argument on the wrong Due Process
Clause. And then, according to Amar and Wildenthal, the Court affirmed
Twitchell's death sentence because his lawyer forgot to say, "Oh by the way,
the Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth." The
sheer inhumanity that this argument entails is reason enough to reject it and
conclude, instead, that the Court was not aware of incorporation theory.
Pragmatic political considerations support this conclusion. Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase had sought the Republican nomination for president in
1860 and finished fourth on the first ballot. When Lincoln needed two
delegates to win the nomination on the fourth ballot, they came from Chase's
delegation.11 7 Appointed Secretary of the Treasury by Lincoln, he watched
Lincoln's popularity plummet during the early years of the war and then
began maneuvering to achieve the nomination in 1864.118 When those efforts
failed, he accepted Lincoln's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. While a sitting Chief Justice, he sought the presidency again in 1868.
He wrote the Court's opinion in Twitchell six months later. 119
It would have been helpful to Chase's political ambitions to embrace the
position that Jacob Howard took in the Senate: The "privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States" include "the personal rights guarantied and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution."' 120 We know that
Chase appreciated the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment because he
had correctly predicted that Congress would seat senators and representatives
from the Southern states that ratified it. 121 Thus, in my view, had Chase
known of the incorporation theory of Bingham and Howard, he would have
written a very different opinion from the one he wrote. 122
117 JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE, A BIOGRAPHY 220 (1995).
1 1 8 Id. at 290-345.
119 Id. at 426-32.
120 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
121 JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 4, at 169.
122 As this Response was going to press, Richard Aynes helpfully sent me
circumstantial evidence suggesting that Chase probably knew of Bingham's
incorporation theory. See, e.g., Harold M. Hyman, Salmon Portland Chase, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 136 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992) (asserting that Chase believed that the Thirteenth Amendment
incorporated the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights not only against the
states but also against private actors). I did not change my contrary speculation in the text
for two reasons. First, I did not have time to explore and evaluate the new evidence.
Second, as I indicate in the text, I cannot explain why a politician-judge like Chase could
have had Bingham's theory in his mind and then written an opinion explicitly re-
affirming Barron. It makes no sense. Aynes's intriguing evidence, to me, only deepens
the Twitchell mystery. Hopefully, Wildenthal and I will have another shot at the
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Why did the Court not know about incorporation?. Members of the Court
had the opportunity to mingle with members of Congress much more then
than today. The Court met in the Old Senate Chamber, which was next to the
chamber where the Senate debated the Fourteenth Amendment. 123 Four of
the Justices roomed at the National Hotel, where four Senators and seven
Representatives also roomed.124
Would something as visible and imfiportant to the future of the country as
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment not have come up in informal
conversations? If it did, we must assume that the Bingham-Howard view was
not widely held, not discussed, or, again, that the Twitchell Court was aware
of incorporation and chose not to mention it. 'If Section 1 was not a topic of
informal conversation between justices andcongressmen, it is hard to believe
that the public discourse was informed by the theory of incorporation.
Wildenthal thinks that I read too much into the silence in Twitchell. For
him, the failure of the defendant or the Court to raise the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, which undoubtedly applied to the states,
shows that no one was thinking about due process. But my point is not about
the lack of due process talk-whether due process required better notice than
Twitchell received depends on one's interpretive account of due process. The
Sixth Amendment notice provision requires no similar interpretation. When
Twitchell lodged his notice argument in the Sixth Amendment, and squarely
faced the Barron barrier that the Court ultimately found persuasive, the most
logical move to avoid Barron was to remind the Court what Howard and
Bingham had said about incorporation. That there was no incorporation talk
by anyone, Wildenthal concedes, should make incorporationists "uneasy." It
makes me doubt that there was any kind of general understanding in the
country about what Bingham and Howard intended Section 1 to do.
, Finally, here is a Twitchell argument that I know Wildenthal will
entertain because the first step is his idea. The one inference that we can
draw from Twitchell with certainty is that Twitchell's lawyer, William
Wheeler Hubbell, did not mention incorporation. Seeking background on
Hubbell, I uncovered a monograph that he published in 1863 in the midst of
the Civil War. Entitled "The Way to Secure Peace and Establish Unity as
One Nation," the monograph included proposed amendments to the
Constitution that Hubbell believed could be embraced by both the Union and
Fourteenth Amendment riddle, and we can pay particular attention to the Twitchell
enigma.
123 THE SUPREME COURT A TO Z 207 (Kenneth Just ed., CQ Press 2003) (1998).
124 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 68 (1971) (noting
that Justices Nelson, Clifford, Miller, and Davis roomed at the National by the late
1860s); PERLEY POORE, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, SECOND SESSION, FORTY-FIRST
CONGRESS 116-19 (1869) (providing addresses of members of Congress).
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Confederate states and would, thus, end the bloody Civil War. Article 17
provides:
The Constitution of the United States, and its Amendments, are hereby
declared to constitute the People of the United States, One Nation, and are
the supreme law of the land, together with all laws made to carry them into
effect. And all other powers not prohibited to the States, are inherent in and
reserved, to be exercised by the States, or the people thereof,
respectively. 125
It is clear that Hubbell thought that the amendments to the Constitution,
the existing ones and the new ones he proposed, should be binding on the
states. It also appears that he understood Barron and thus knew that a
constitutional amendment was necessary to make the states subject to the
amendments.
Six years later, Hubbell had an opportunity to turn his incorporation idea
into law. He merely had to ask the Supreme Court to ratify John Bingham's
vision of the Fourteenth Amendment. How are we to understand Hubbell's
failure to argue incorporation? Notice that he appeared to assume in 1869
that the Sixth Amendment bound the states without an assist from the
Fourteenth Amendment. As this is contrary to his apparent understanding in
1863, it raises the possibility that he thought incorporation so obvious that he
did not have to spell it out for the Court. But this is not satisfying for three
reasons. First, lawyers love to belabor the obvious. Second, obvious or not,
he would have wanted credit for being the first to make the argument. Third,
nineteenth-century formalism would have required the Fourteenth
Amendment as a "bridge" to the Sixth Amendment. Yet Hubbell never
mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment.
That leaves, I think, only one possibility. Hubbell argued in 1869 that the
Sixth Amendment applied directly to the states, expecting to lose, because he
thought he had no good argument. But that necessarily means that he did not
understand the Fourteenth Amendment to make the Bill of Rights binding on
the states. And if a constitutional theorist who had promoted the concept of
incorporation did not share Bingham's understanding, it is unlikely that the
members of the Court would have had even an inkling about what Bingham
was attempting to do.
The truth is that no one on the Twitchell Court understood the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate the Sixth. The great clarity about incorporation
that Amar believes ran, like water, through the halls of Congress did not seep
into the Old Senate Chamber. Crosskey concedes this much, noting the
125 WILLIAM WHEELER HUBBELL, THE WAY TO SECURE PEACE AND ESTABLISH
UNITY AS ONE NATION (1863).
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"rather shocking, but by no means unique, indication of the inalertness of the
men who composed the Court of the period."' 26 He offers no evidence that
the Chase Court was especially "inalert."
Amar signals the weakness of his argument here. After dismissing
Twitchell as having no significance for the ,incorporation debate, Amar drops
a footnote that begins, "Twitchell is perhaps explicable as an unthinking
reflection of the notion that Section 1 would have its main application in the
Southern states." 127 But if the Supreme Court that sat in the same building as
Congress indulged "unthinking reflection" that Section 1 did not generally
incorporate the Bill of Rights, or was "inalert" to this possibility, how are we
to believe that the state legislatures knew of incorporation?
Charles Fairman found several state constitutions or statutes that suggest
"inalertness" to incorporation, though some of the inconsistencies are, to my
mind, trivial. 128 For example, the lack of a grand jury clause in a dozen or so
state constitutions 129 is not very probative on the intent of the ratifying
legislatures. Those states could have known about incorporation and decided
to ratify the amendment because, on balance, the benefits outweighed the
harm of having to provide grand juries. Or as Wildenthal puts it in an earlier
article, "Given the political imperatives for Republicans supporting
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is doubtful whether anyone
considered or cared much about the relatively minor particulars in which
some states were not already in conformity with the Bill of Rights."
130
But Wildenthal's argument does not explain the five states that took
action to modify or eliminate their grand jury requirements after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 1311 concede that there was no reason to
expect states without grand jury requirements to rush to a convention to
126 Crosskey, supra note 3, at 113.
127 AMAR, supra note 35 at 207 n.*.
128 For an example of a trivial difference, the 1846 New Jersey Constitution required
that the amount in controversy in civil suits exceed fifty dollars to trigger the right to.a
jury trial, rather than twenty dollars as required by the Seventh Amendment, proof to
Fairman "that the Fourteenth Amendment was not regarded as bringing Amendments I to
VIII in its wake." Fairman, supra note 3, at 88.
129 See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the
Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1476 (2000).
130 Id. at 1478.
131 See CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1879) (requiring it); COLO. CONST. art. HI, § 23
(1876) (permitting legislature to abolish grand jury requirement); GA. CONST. of 1868
(not mentioning grand juries), WIS. CONST. § 8 (1870) (replacing requirement of grand
juries with general due process requirement); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82 (1868) (permitting
prosecutors to proceed by information). A comparison of the two requirements is




change their constitutions, but why would states that already provided grand
juries change their laws to flout the Fourteenth Amendment? Wildenthal
dismisses these actions as limited to the rather unimportant right of grand
juries. 132 Perhaps. But where was the discussion about incorporation?
I found only two cases relevant to incorporation that were decided within
the period I am analyzing. They reach opposite conclusions. In Rowan v.
State, the Wisconsin. Supreme Court held that prosecution for a felony upon
an information did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 133 The defendant
did not make the incorporation argument that he was entitled to a grand jury
because the Fifth Amendment was now part of the Fourteenth. Instead, he
argued that due process of law required an indictment. If incorporation had
been known to Rowan's lawyer, he would have argued the specific language
of the Fifth Amendment grand jury clause, as imposed on the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the vague language of "due process
of law." The court easily rejected the due process argument:
[T]he words "due process of law," in this [Fourteenth] amendment, do not
mean and have not the effect to limit the powers of the state governments to
prosecutions for crimes by indictments, but these words do mean law in its
regular course of administration according to the prescribed forms and in
accordance with the general rules for the protection of individual rights. 134
In United States v. Hall,135 a federal court in Alabama articulated the
incorporation position as clearly as had Jacob Howard. The narrow holding
was that Congress had the authority to pass legislation designed to protect
free speech and encourage citizens to vote. In reaching that conclusion, the
court wrote:
We think, therefore, that the right of freedom of speech, and the other rights
enumerated in the first eight articles of amendment to the constitution of the
United States, are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, that they are secured by the constitution, that congress has the power
to protect them by appropriate legislation. 136
It is difficult to be clearer than that. What are we to make of the fact that
Hall was never cited for its point about incorporation? It is yet one more
sound of silence. Moreover, Hall is additional evidence of the "inalertness"
132 Wildenthal, supra note 129, at 1477-80.
133 30 Wis. 129 (1872).
134 Id. at 149.
135 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
136 Id. at 82.
2007] 1655
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
of lawyers. The court commented that the.case "seems to have been argued
for the defense, without reference to the recent amendments to the
constitution." 137
Amar argues that the evidence of'.silence shows that "many informed
men simply were not thinking carefully about the words of Section One at
all."' 138 This concession does not trouble Amar who presses the case for
incorporation on the ground that the 'text and debate in Congress were clear
enough. Wildenthal sets a higher bar rfor .himself than does Amar.
Wildenthal, appropriately, asks the hard question: did Congress clearly,
publicly, and candidly convey its intent..to fasten the first eight amendments
on the states?
If Congress was conveying that iritent, Orville Browning, Samuel
Nicholas, and a federal court in Alabama seemed to be listening. But the
message did not get to the Wisconsin Supreme Court; the United States
Supreme Court; the lawyers representing Twitchell, Hall, and Rowan; or the
legislatures or constitutional conventions in the states that modified or
eliminated their grand jury requirements after 1866.
VIII. THE TRUTH ABOUT INCORPORATION
It is time to tell the truth about the incorporation riddle. It cannot be
conclusively solved without ex ante presumptions. If one presumes that the
only intent that matters is that of Bingham because he was the drafter and no
one in Congress denied his reading of Section 1, then incorporation of the
Bill of Rights must be accepted. If one seeks to show, as Wildenthal does,
that Congress clearly, publicly, and candidly conveyed its intent to
incorporate, we need more than Bingham. If so, we can, in my view, count a
few others in the Thirty-Ninth Congress. And we can count the Hall opinion.
Is that enough?
After reviewing the evidence in greater detail than I did in 2001, and
reflecting on Wildenthal's work and that of other incorporation supporters, I
am now convinced that a plausible case can be made that Congress intended
incorporation of most of the rights in the first eight amendments. Moreover, I
now think that the sounds of silence during the ratification process are not a
conclusive rejection of incorporation. But I remain unsure if there is enough
evidence to show a clear communication to the states and the country.
I doubt that any one piece of evidence of the sounds of silence is, by
itself, sufficient to counteract the evidence that at least five or six members
of Congress understood Section 1 to incorporate the Bill of Rights. But when
137 Id. at 81.
138 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1250 (1992).
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one adds up all of them, it becomes difficult to conclude that Congress
clearly, publicly, and candidly conveyed its intent to the country. I think it
unlikely that state legislatures in Sacramento, California, and Des Moines,
Iowa, for example, knew what Chief Justice Chase and the other members of
the Twitchell Court did not know. : 7.
I do not claim that the evidence presented here settles the question.
History cannot settle all questions, and.I believe the Fourteenth Amendment
riddle is one of them. Fairman and Berger do not persuade that history settles
the incorporation question in the negative. Crosskey, Curtis, Amar,
Wildenthal, and others, do not persuade that history settles the question the
other way.
It turns out that the Fourteenth Amendment riddle can be conclusively
solved using existing evidence only by a magician's parlor trick. Writers who
claim that history settles the incorporation question, including my 2001
rejection of incorporation, become magicians who distract the reader while
they quietly put into place the presumptions that will provide clear proof.
Even Wildenthal, whose work I greatly admire, eventually retreats to what is
close to a "plain text" presumption. Now unburdened of any agenda, I can
expose the trick for what it is. All efforts to solve the Fourteenth Amendment
riddle to date have, alas, failed.
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